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School Vouchers: Does Increased Competition Benefit the Masses?
Abstract
The following review attempts to organize and consolidate these competing schools of thought [about
school voucher programs]. In the next section, I will summarize the different policies implemented by
state and national institutions, as well as their varying degrees of effectiveness. Later sections will
discuss public school inefficiencies and nonmarket interactions such as the peer effect. A concluding
section summarizes the policy implications of the review and discusses potential directions for future
research.
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School Vouchers: Does Increased
Competition Benefit the Masses?
I. Introduction
Three decades have passed since Milton
Friedman proposed school vouchers as the
answer to America’s education crisis. One of
the most appealing aspects of Friedman’s idea
was the claim that vouchers would increase
competition among all schools, both public and
private. Despite continued majority support
for public education, lawmakers have used
variations on Friedman’s argument to justify
educational reforms in urban areas, which
allow for more parental choice and encourage
school competition (Milton Friedman and Rose
Freidman, 1979). Today, as policy makers debate
the value of a national school voucher program,
economists have similarly considered the merits
of the proposed reforms. Some conclude that a
voucher system, which would reduce the size of
the public school system’s market share, would
not result in greater school efficiency; others
argue that opening public schools to competition
would foster dramatic improvements in innercity education.
The following review attempts to organize
and consolidate these competing schools of
thought. In the next section, I will summarize
the different policies implemented by state and
national institutions, as well as their varying
degrees of effectiveness. Later sections will
discuss public school inefficiencies and nonmarket interactions such as the peer effect.
A concluding section summarizes the policy
implications of the review and discusses potential
directions for future research.

Anna Konradi




Anna Konradi is a first-year political science
and economics double major from Zionsville, Indiana. She wrote “School Vouchers: Does Increased
Competition Benefit the Masses?” for her Urban Economics class.

II. School Voucher Policies
David Figlio and Cecilia Rouse (2005) study
the effects of the threat of school vouchers and
school stigma in Florida on the performance of
“low-performing” schools using student-level
data from a subset of several critical districts.
Under Jeb Bush’s A+ Plan, districts administer
standardized tests for all grade levels between 3
and 10, with grades 4, 5, and 8 being the “critical
grades” that the states use to evaluate school
performance. Districts that perform particularly
poorly are forced to offer their students vouchers
to attend other institutions. As an additional
incentive to school districts to improve their
performance, all test scores are made public.
The results of this study are not altogether
surprising. Schools across the board focus
additional attention on their low-performing
students and increased their scores on subsequent
standardized exams. However, Figlio and
Rouse (2005) find that the key asset of Florida’s
accountability system is not the threat of the
vouchers themselves, but rather the stigma
attached to having to publicly advertise poor
test scores. The results of the study indicate
that the A+ Plan (as will its protégé No Child
Left Behind) increases student performance by
requiring accountability at every grade level, but
not because of the threat of school vouchers.
Programs to enhance the quality of
education are not limited to the United States.
Sweden is perhaps the world’s most radical
example of school reform, when in the 1990s
it instituted an innovative voucher system
and parental choice reform. In contrast to US
programs whereby vouchers are usually given
to the poorest students in low-performing
institutions, the Swedish system makes the
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program universal. Unlike the American system,
independent schools cannot refuse admission to
low-ability students, so school systems cannot
isolate high-ability students, and their presence
among lower-performing counterparts produces
a positive externality (Sandström and Bergström,
2005). The results of the study indicate not
only that the voucher system is beneficial for
the holistic population of Swedish students,
but also improves the quality of education for
students with a poor socio-economic background.
Municipal schools, which for the most part
disapproved of the Swedish reforms, had to
improve the quality of their own districts in order
to stay competitive with the new independent
schools. Grades and test score increases are
statistically significant across the board, and
the study does not find any evidence of grade
inflation in either the municipalities or in the
independent school systems (Sandström and
Bergström, 2005). In contrast to the Figlio and
Rouse (2005) experiment, the Swedish system
bypasses the standardized testing step. It finds
that the vouchers themselves, and not just the
threat of giving them away, have proven to be an
advantageous policy in this country.
III. School Inefficiencies
Many education reformers hope that the
implementation of a voucher program will
help to eliminate public school inefficiencies
across the country. When met with the threat
of a program, it is thought that schools will
significantly reduce the amount of wasteful
spending that goes into teachers’ and
administrators’ salaries.
According to a study by Ronald Erhenberg,
Richard Chaykowski, and Randy Erhenberg
(1988, p.397), the financial incentive offered
to school administrators does not “seem strong
enough to elicit much extra effort from a
superintendent to improve his school district’s
performance.” The authors find a statistically
significant correlation between superintendent
salaries and student performance for only some
of their specifications. There is no correlation
48

between superintendent salaries and the school
district’s performance.
While upper level administrators do not
seem to be the main contributing factors, lower
school performance in the public sector could,
in part at least, be a result of highly powerful
teacher organizations. When unions gain power
in a district, they draw power away from the
administrators to put it in the hands of teachers
and other personnel. Their power is derived
from the union’s ability to control and monitor
the education process by influencing hiring,
regulating the evaluation of teachers, and
encouraging conformity amongst their own
(Rangazas, 1997). The produced inefficiency,
commonly referred to as the X-inefficiency, is
thus caused by the public school’s inability to
control teacher effort relative to the ability of the
private school system to do the same. Randall
Eberts and Joe Stone (1986) quantitatively
determine that unions lower performance,
raise the cost of education, or both. However,
these studies contradict Michael Kurth (1987),
who finds that unions actually raise student
performance, while only slightly increasing
wages.
Another school of thought is the idea that
there is an inefficient mix between administrative
and teacher inputs in the school budget. Peter
Rangazas (1997), in his budget maximizing
model, hypothesizes that bureaucrats in the
public school sector are profit-maximizers, and
are thus more concerned about maximizing
the size of their agencies than maximizing
the agencies’ stated objectives. Unlike the
other studies in this section of the analysis,
Rangazas finds that vouchers would reduce the
inefficiency in the public sector, but cause greater
inefficiencies in the private market (thus hurting
the children of families who would attend private
schools with or without the voucher program).
John Chubb and Terry Moe (1990) quantify
the effects of restrictions placed on principals by
both the administrations and the unions. They
find that an index measure of organizational
effectiveness (which includes factors such as
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academic excellence, principal motivation,
teacher professionalism, disciplinary fairness
and effectiveness) is correlated significantly with
student performance. Those schools that have
a high degree of organizational effectiveness
are also the ones which granted their principals
greater discretion over curriculum and personnel
decisions. According to the Chubb and Moe
(1990) study, a more efficient solution than
vouchers would be to centralize responsibility in
the hands of principals in the public sector.
A study by Maria Jose Luengo-Prado and
Oscar Volij (2003) characterizes the general
observations of the X-inefficiency subscribers.
They show that the introduction of a voucher
system may result in a Pareto improvement as
an equilibrium outcome. That is, they show that
the equilibrium in an economy without vouchers
is inefficient (because parents who are willing to
pay the higher cost of a better education for their
students cannot, because of budget constraints,
afford to relocate to a better district, and are
thus compelled to send their children to local
schools), and that the introduction of a voucher
system, without additional government money
transfers, would result in a more preferred state
of affairs whereby parents would have a greater
ability to exercise their roles as consumers in a
free market.
IV. School Vouchers and the Peer Effect
The voucher system alone does not appear
to be solely responsible for the increases in
educational performance. Other variables,
such as the peer effect, play an important role
in bettering the education system for students
who can take advantage of the new voucher
programs. In their study on peer effects in the
Chinese secondary education system, Weili Ding
and Steven Lehrer (2006) explore how nonmarket (or social) interactions affect education
outcomes. The premise of their research contends
that each student influences his classmates not
only through knowledge spillovers and how
teachers respond to him, but also in how he
affects classroom standards.

In their experiment, Ding and Lehrer
(2006) exploit the Chinese system to isolate the
peer effect from teacher quality (this variable
is explicitly quantified in the Chinese system)
and other variables. Their data indicate that
“peer groups operate in a non-linear manner”
and that individual students respond negatively
to a variation in peer quality (p. 32). Because
the peer group effects are substantial, an
appropriate government policy might be to
exploit them by optimally grouping students in
different classrooms in order to achieve specific
educational and long-term socioeconomic results.
These findings exist in concert with those of
Sandström and Bergström (2005), as they both
credit the positive peer effects with substantial
increases in education quality.
The peer effect can be extended beyond the
reach of the international systems. Even in the
United States, researchers such as James Poterba
(1995) point out that a positive peer effect
correlates significantly with graduation rates,
SAT scores, and university attendance rates.
What Poterba’s (1995) study fails to indicate,
however, is that many of the private schools
which would have these positive peer effects
select on the basis of competency. Thus subpar students in low-performing schools would
have nowhere to turn to with their vouchers.
They face the possibility of being left in a lowperforming school, which could suffer from
an even more dire lack of funding than before.
Such is the case made by Stephen Ferris and
Edwin West (2004 p. 23), who conclude that a
negative external effect of vouchers would be to
encourage for-profit private institutions to “skim
the cream off” off the public school system and
thus lower the average quality of the students left
behind. According to Ferris and West, even if a
voucher system improved the overall efficiency
of the educational system, it would exacerbate
inequalities across districts.
V. Conclusion
Recent studies have demonstrated that
Friedman’s original thesis is in no way bullet
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proof. While it is possible that a voucher
system could increase the quality of education
for students in poor districts, scholars around
the table seem to agree that the voucher
itself only plays a small role in consumer
satisfaction. Other factors such as administrative
and union inefficiency and the peer effect
direct policymakers toward other avenues of
exploration. While the voucher system might
help improve the quality of education in
low-income districts, the threat of a voucher
may impact the mentality of the “education
producers.” Administrators and teachers alike
may become less self-serving profit maximizers
and instead focus more of their energy on the
quality of their output (education).
It is yet to be seen whether the voucher
system can ever have nationwide success. But
before such a policy could ever be implemented,
lawmakers should consider exploring the
positive and negative social implications of the
proposal. On the one hand, a voucher system
may result in the more efficient use of public
resources in education. On the other, vouchers
could exacerbate economic, racial, or ability
segregation. Under a system where the value of
the voucher does not cover the full cost of tuition
at the private institution, the poorest students and
their families will be left in the public schools,
possibly with even fewer resources than before.
With their more affluent classmates away, the
most destitute students are likely to be deprived
of the positive peer effects associated with high
performing students and their own standards for
personal excellence could suffer as a result.
Another possibility to consider is the
impact of vouchers on the social morale of the
community. The public school has traditionally
been a haven for community cohesiveness,
a place where residents can put aside their
differences and participate in a common cause.
Would the introduction of the voucher system
taint this unity or would it bring the district
together to participate in a mass re-bolstering of
public education? All these possible implications
should be carefully considered before any drastic
50

changes are made to the present system. Another
possible avenue to consider would be the cultural
differences that make programs work across
different countries. Would the individualistic
mindset commonly associated with the United
States ever be able to accept the type of universal
voucher program that exists in more liberal
Sweden? Could we ever segregate students based
on ability as they do in China?
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